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Security bulletins

Security bulletins and advisories from Oblique. These include security issues with Oblique itself, and external incidents that could impact Oblique.

OBL-2026-001: GitHub integration could send app credentials to an arbitrary host

An Oblique administrator could configure a GitHub integration to send credentials for the Oblique GitHub App to a server they controlled, which could have been used to access other customers’ GitHub organizations. We fixed the issue on October 8, 2026, and found no evidence that it was ever exploited.

What happened?

An internal review found that the GitHub integration’s base URI, a setting intended for GitHub Enterprise Cloud organizations, accepted any host. An administrator of an Oblique tenant could point it at a server they controlled. The next time Oblique synced with GitHub, or when the integration was removed, Oblique would then send that server a short-lived JWT signed with the Oblique GitHub App’s private key, instead of sending it to GitHub.

The JWT authenticates as the GitHub App itself, rather than as its installation in any one organization. It could have been used to request access tokens for any GitHub organization with the Oblique GitHub App installed, with the permissions that organization granted the app, including managing organization membership, teams and repository access.

The issue was introduced on September 23, 2026. We discovered and fixed it on October 8, 2026 by removing the base URI setting entirely. The GitHub integration now only ever sends requests to api.github.com.

What was the impact?

No GitHub integration in a customer tenant was ever configured with a host other than github.com. We have reviewed the base URI of every GitHub integration, including deleted ones, and the full audit history of changes made to them since the issue was introduced. The Oblique GitHub App’s credentials were never sent anywhere other than to GitHub.

The GitHub App’s private key was never exposed. Since no tokens were sent elsewhere, and any that had been would have expired within the hour, we elected not to rotate the key.

Who was affected?

Oblique was not compromised and no Oblique customers were affected.

What do I need to do?

No action is required from Oblique customers.

Mini Shai-Hulud

A self-spreading supply chain worm compromised dozens of npm packages, including widely used @tanstack/* router and start packages. Oblique’s production builds and CI/CD pipelines were not affected.

What happened?

On May 11, 2026, multiple security vendors reported that an attacker republished compromised versions of more than 50 npm packages, including much of the @tanstack/* router and start family, @uipath/*, and several smaller scopes. The malicious versions smuggled a prepare script via an optionalDependencies entry pointing at an attacker-controlled GitHub commit. On install, the payload exfiltrated GitHub, npm, and cloud credentials over HTTPS, then attempted to publish further compromised versions from any maintainer tokens it found - the "self-spreading" behaviour that mirrored prior Shai-Hulud campaigns.

Oblique depends on several @tanstack/* packages but was pinned below the compromised 1.169.x package version. Our NPM package manager, pnpm, is configured with a 72-hour minimumReleaseAge cooldown, which prevented any version uptake during the window in which the bad releases were live on the registry. As defence in depth, we also rely on pnpm 10’s default-deny on dependency lifecycle scripts and our explicit onlyBuiltDependencies allowlist mean that the malicious prepare script could not have executed in our CI runners or developer machines even if a bad version had been resolved.

What was the impact?

We have verified that none of the compromised package versions were ever resolved or installed in our production builds, CI/CD pipelines, or developer environments. No Oblique credentials or source were exposed.

Who was affected?

Neither Oblique nor any Oblique customers are affected.

What do I need to do?

No action is required from Oblique customers.

Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming

Many widely used npm packages here recently impacted by a supply chain attack. Although Oblique depends on an affected package provided by PostHog, malicious versions were never incorporated into our production builds or CI/CD.

What happened?

Multiple security vendors reported on November 24th, 2025 that a group behind a previous supply chain attack were able to again inject malicious code into prominent npm packages. This included JavaScript SDKs for PostHog, a product analytics platform. Though Oblique depends on the posthog-js package, it was pinned at version 1.297.3, and so unaffected.
More broadly, Oblique has taken this opportunity to introduce cooldown periods in both pnpm and Dependabot for internal dependency uptake.

What was the impact?

We have verified that our systems never imported the impacted versions, even in our development CI/CD systems.

Who was affected?

Neither Oblique nor any Oblique customers are affected.

What do I need to do?

No action is required from Oblique customers.

@ctrl/tinycolor

The widely used NPM package @ctrl/tinycolor was recently backdoored with malicious code. Although Oblique depends on this package, affected versions were never incorporated into our production builds or CI/CD.

What happened?

Several security vendors reported on September 15, 2025 that versions 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 of the package @ctrl/tinycolor were updated with malicious code. These malicious packages scan build and deployment environments for credentials, then publish secrets and private code repos publicly. Over 40+ other packages incorporated these versions. While Oblique depends on this package through Astro, it is pinned at version 4.1.0, and so unaffected.

What was the impact?

We have verified that our systems never imported the impacted versions, even in our development CI/CD systems.

Who was affected?

Neither Oblique nor any Oblique customers are affected.

What do I need to do?

No action is required from Oblique customers.

Salesloft

Cloudflare support tickets, including Oblique’s support tickets with Cloudflare, were breached. Although Oblique is affected, there is no impact. None of Oblique’s Cloudflare support tickets include customer data or credentials.

What happened?

Oblique uses Cloudflare for some builds and web hosting, and we have previously communicated with Cloudflare support. A security breach of Salesloft Drift resulted in unauthorized access to Cloudflare support tickets. The breach allowed access to the text content of support communications. Oblique received a notification from Cloudflare on 2025-09-02 that Oblique’s data may have been exposed in the Salesloft incident.

What was the impact?

We have conducted a thorough review of all support communications and confirmed:

  • None of Oblique’s API keys, access tokens, or other credentials were shared in support tickets
  • No Oblique customer data was disclosed in support communications

Who was affected?

Neither Oblique nor any Oblique customers are affected.

What do I need to do?

No action is required from Oblique customers.